Pakistan has announced a new counter-terrorism operation named Azm-e-Istehkam to address the rising wave of terrorism within the country. This operation adds to the list of previous counter-terrorism efforts, which include notable operations such as Al Mizan (2002), Zalzala (2008), Sher Dil, Rah-e-Haq, Rah-e-Nijat (2009), Zarb-i-Azab (2014), and Raddul Fassad (2017). Despite these efforts, the persistent need for new operations highlights ongoing challenges in addressing terrorism effectively.
The continuing need for new operations raises questions about their objectives and effectiveness. Key factors contributing to the persistence of terrorism include the flawed approach of successive governments towards peace deals with the Taliban, the evolving strategies of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and complex federal-provincial relations. These issues suggest that addressing underlying crises may be more effective than repeatedly launching new operations.
A significant challenge for Azm-e-Istehkam is the lack of consensus among stakeholders. The federal and provincial governments, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), are not aligned on the operation’s objectives. The KP provincial government has expressed reservations, with local political leaders demanding more transparency and consultation. Notable figures, such as Maulana Fazlur Rehman, have warned that the operation could exacerbate the crisis in KP. This lack of unity could hinder the operation’s success.
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In contrast, Canada’s counter-terrorism strategy post-9/11 involved comprehensive stakeholder engagement, including collaboration with international partners and various law enforcement agencies. Pakistan’s current approach lacks this level of coordination, leading to skepticism among local populations. The trust deficit, especially in marginalized regions like former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan, further complicates the situation. Historical grievances, such as inadequate compensation for damage caused by previous operations, exacerbate local distrust.
Additionally, the TTP’s shift in strategy towards targeting military and police personnel rather than civilians presents a new challenge. Recent attacks, including those by the newly emerged Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), underscore the evolving nature of the threat. The government must build the capacity of security forces to address these tactics effectively, involving joint drills and training sessions.
Religious extremism also fuels terrorism in Pakistan. The TTP’s base includes radical groups frustrated with the state’s failure to implement Sharia law. The previous operations aimed to counter this threat but have not fully addressed the root causes. The current operation must incorporate measures to address the ideological drivers of extremism.
To enhance the effectiveness of Azm-e-Istehkam, Pakistan should avoid pursuing peace deals with the Taliban, a strategy that has previously failed and led to the notion of “good” and “bad” Taliban. Engaging local communities in KP is crucial, as they bear the brunt of military operations. Learning from past experiences, such as the Swat operation, emphasizes the importance of transparent communication with affected populations.
Building police capacity and addressing the TTP’s military targeting strategy is essential. Increasing investment in education can also play a role in promoting tolerance and countering extremism. Lastly, pursuing negotiations, including engaging with the Afghan government, could offer a path to long-term peace, as demonstrated by Colombia’s peace process with the FARC. Pakistan’s approach to counter-terrorism must adapt to evolving threats, build stakeholder consensus, and address underlying issues to achieve lasting success.
